A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH TO ORGANIC FOODS: AN ANALYSIS OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND POLICY
Jill McCluskey
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 2000, vol. 29, issue 01, 9
Abstract:
Demand for healthy, safe and environmentally friendly food products has been increasing. In response, producers are marketing organic and other quality-differentiated foods, sometimes claiming to have followed sound environmental and animal welfare practices. These products frequently have unobservable quality attributes. If the profit-maximizing producer is able to deceive the consumer with a false claim, then he or she will enjoy a higher price with lower production costs (compared to the full disclosure outcomes). The analysis described in this paper shows that repeat-purchase relationships and third party monitoring are required for high-quality credence goods to be available. Policy implications of this analysis for national organic food standards are discussed.
Keywords: Demand; and; Price; Analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (110)
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Related works:
Journal Article: A Game Theoretic Approach to Organic Foods: An Analysis of Asymmetric Information and Policy (2000) 
Working Paper: A Game Theoretic Approach to Organic Foods: An Analysis of Asymmetric Information and Policy (1999) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:arerjl:31334
DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.31334
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