Food Aid and the WTO: Can New Rules Be Effective?

Ryan Cardwell

Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, 2008, vol. 09, issue 01, 20

Abstract: A new Agreement on Agriculture from the Doha Development Agenda negotiations is certain to contain binding rules on food aid shipments. Negotiating parties are concerned that food aid has been used as a form of export competition policy, and they seek the use of coercive WTO legislation to prevent the disposal of surplus agricultural commodities as food aid. Current Uruguay Round food aid guidelines are contrasted with the most recent Doha Development Agenda proposals, and the prospective effectiveness of new rules is assessed. Food aid rules will be difficult to enforce within the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding. Also, exogenous policy changes in donor countries are reducing the relevance of rules that target food aid as a means of surplus disposal. The future of international food aid governance in the event of a Doha Round collapse is also discussed.

Keywords: Food Security and Poverty; International Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ecjilt:6313

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.6313

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