The Doha Talks and the Bargaining Surplus in Agriculture

William Hartley Furtan, A. Guzel and Kostas Karantininis

Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, 2007, vol. 08, issue 2, 17

Abstract: The Doha Round has been slow to achieve a reduction in the level of agricultural protection. This remains the case notwithstanding the substantial economic benefits that would arise from a more liberal agricultural trading regime. We provide one explanation for this slowness using a simple bargaining model. We demonstrate that the bargaining countries received a substantial fiscal gain from reducing government expenditures in the run-up to the Uruguay Round. This fiscal pressure was sufficient to block rent seekers who wanted farm payments to continue. Since the Uruguay Round these fiscal constraints have been reduced and the same pressure to reach a bargain and control rent-seeking behaviour is not present in the Doha Round.

Keywords: International; Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7706/files/08020138.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ecjilt:7706

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.7706

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy from Estey Centre for Law and Economics in International Trade Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().