Tariff-Rate Quotas, Rent-Shifting and the Selling of Domestic Access
Bruno Larue,
Harvey Lapan and
Jean-Philippe Gervais ()
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, 2010, vol. 11, issue 01, 14
Abstract:
Tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) have replaced quotas at the end of the Uruguay Round. We analyze TRQs when a foreign firm competes against a domestic firm in the latter’s market. Our benchmark is the strategic rent-shifting tariff. We show that the domestic price-equivalent TRQ is a better instrument welfare-wise, as it can extract all of the rents from the foreign firm. We show that different pairs of within-quota tariff and quota can support full rent extraction. The implication is that reduction of the former and enlargement of the latter, holding the above-quota tariff constant, may have no liberalizing effects. The first-best TRQ and the strategic tariff generate different prices. When firms have identical and constant marginal cost, the first-best TRQ entails selling a subsidy to the foreign firm and forcing the exit of the domestic firm.
Keywords: Financial Economics; International Relations/Trade; Marketing; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/90591/files/laruelapangervais11-1.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Tariff-Rate Quotas, Rent-Shifting and the Selling of Domestic Access (2010)
Working Paper: Tariff-Rate Quotas, Rent-Shifting and the Selling of Domestic Access (2010) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ecjilt:90591
DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.90591
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy from Estey Centre for Law and Economics in International Trade Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().