Vers une nouvelle réforme de l'organisation commune de marché de la banane

Catherine Laroche-Dupraz
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Catherine Laroche Dupraz

Économie rurale, 2001, vol. 261

Abstract: Sharecropping is usually explained by a trade-off between tenant's risk aversion and incentives (standard Principal-Agent approach) or between agency costs under various market imperfections, and with risk-neutral agents (transaction costs approach). This Mexican case-study illustrates a situation where contractual rationales refute the standard Principal-Agent model and where share- cropping can be analyzed as a resource pooling device, but without any major role given to moral hazard in contractual choice. In this situation, sharecropping features a partnership rather than agency relationships.

Date: 2001
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Related works:
Journal Article: Vers une nouvelle reforme de l'organisation commune de marche de la banane (2001)
Journal Article: Vers une nouvelle réforme de l'organisation commune de marché de la banane (2001)
Working Paper: Vers une nouvelle réforme de l'organisation commune de marché de la banane (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ersfer:355045

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.355045

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