Optimizing Inspection Strategies to Enforce Organic Farming Standards

Christian Lippert, Alexander Zorn and Stephan Dabbert

German Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2016, vol. 65, issue 01

Abstract: The organic market depends on an effective and efficient certification system. Control bodies or authorities are pivotal to this system. From a social point of view, our objective is to theoretically optimize inspection strategies. For this, sanctions and inspection frequencies have to be implemented in a way that the net social damage arising from farmers’ non-compliance with an organic standard will be minimized. In scenarios that combine different kinds of social damages, fines and compliance cost distributions for an assumed set of farms we use Monte Carlo simulations to model farmers’ non-compliance and resulting social damages. Depending on potential reputation losses and com-pliance cost variability among farms we identify different adequate control frequencies.

Keywords: Environmental Economics and Policy; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Risk and Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/284961/files/2_Lippert.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:gjagec:284961

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.284961

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in German Journal of Agricultural Economics from Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, Department for Agricultural Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().