Reputation and Production Standards

Jill McCluskey and Maria Loureiro

Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 2005, vol. 30, issue 01, 11

Abstract: This paper analyzes a monopolist's behavior when consumers cannot observe the production standards. These types of products are usually known as credence goods. The steady-state level of quality with credence goods is found to be lower than that with experience goods, and perfect information goods. The finding that only perceived quality, which is effectively a filtered version of true quality, affects reputation indicates rewards for high quality production are lower in the credence good case. Further, an increase in the level of monitoring can increase the true level of product quality in the market for credence goods.

Keywords: Production; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/30788/files/30010001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:jlaare:30788

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.30788

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics from Western Agricultural Economics Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().