COMPETITIVE BIDDING ON IMPORT TENDERS: THE CASE OF MINOR OILSEEDS

William Wilson and Matthew Diersen ()

Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 2001, vol. 26, issue 01, 16

Abstract: A common and noteworthy application of auctions and bidding is that of tendering for imports, used for both price determination and the allocation of purchases among sellers. In this study we develop a model to evaluate bidding strategies and competition and apply it to Egyptian oilseeds imports. Generally, bids could be explained with a relatively high degree of confidence using accessible data. In addition, there appear to be groups of bidders characterized by differences in their bid functions. These statistical results were used to determine optimal bids and evaluate the effects of several critical variables. The results are particularly interesting for understanding sellers' bidding strategies and competition among rivals, as well as impacts of specific variables on optimal bids and payoffs to sellers.

Keywords: International; Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: COMPETITIVE BIDDING ON IMPORT TENDERS: THE CASE OF MINOR OILSEEDS (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:jlaare:31148

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.31148

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