CONTRACTING FOR NONPOINT-SOURCE POLLUTION ABATEMENT

Olof Bystrom and Daniel Bromley

Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 1998, vol. 23, issue 01, 19

Abstract: This study presents an incentive scheme to control agricultural nonpoint-source pollution. The analysis is based on a principal-agent framework with two parties: farmers and a regulating authority. Our incentive scheme proposes collective penalties as a way to control pollution. Unlike previous analyses of incentive schemes to control agricultural pollution, we suggest nonindividual contracts between farmers and a regulating authority, where farmers can trade pollution abatement efforts. Findings show that the information requirement of a regulatory agency can be substantially reduced if contracts can be made nonindividual.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: CONTRACTING FOR NON-POINT-SOURCE POLLUTION ABATEMENT (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:jlaare:31176

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.31176

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