A Descriptive Summary of Cooperative Governance and Performance

Jason R. V. Franken and Michael L. Cook

Journal of Cooperatives, 2017, vol. 32

Abstract: Empirical work in the field of corporate governance is extensive, but may not uniformly apply to cooperative businesses with patron-driven, multiple objective functions. This descriptive analysis offers further insights into the relation between cooperative governance and performance using unique survey and accounting data. Findings of better performance among firms with smaller boards, and to a lesser extent, those with outside directors seem to extend to the cooperative model. Experienced CEOs and board chairs appear to sacrifice financial performance to better serve patron-members. Director training enhances financial performance. Cooperatives with more active boards and members tend to have better overall performance.

Keywords: Political; Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:jlcoop:301193

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.301193

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