Managers, Boards, and the Principal-Agent Problem in Cooperatives: A Survey of Cooperative Managers in Texas

Frank Seo, Darren Hudson, Donna McCallister, Phil Johnson and John Park

Journal of Cooperatives, 2024, vol. 37

Abstract: The aim of the study is to investigate the possible Principal-Agent (PA) problem between managers and the boards in cooperatives, which no study has examined before. We surveyed 28 cooperative managers in Texas, divided into three sub-category groups, to compare mean differences within a conceptual model. As a result, the investigation yielded no direct evidence of a manager-board PA problem within the survey respondents, which suggests unique characteristics of the PA relationships between managers and the boards in cooperatives compared to investor-oriented firms. Lastly, the comparison revealed behavioral differences between each manager group, which provide implications for cooperative management.

Keywords: Agribusiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:jlcoop:348501

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.348501

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