TRADE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY: THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES PEANUT PROGRAM

Robert B. Borges

Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 1995, vol. 27, issue 2, 18

Abstract: NAFTA and GATT will dramatically alter regulations protecting U.S. peanut markets and will allow foreign producers considerable access to domestic market. Traditionally, the political economy surrounding peanut policy has been favorable to domestic producers. Rising peanut butter imports, decreasing domestic demand, and possibly the inadvertent effects of domestic policy, ironically implemented to protect domestic producers, have contributed to significant increases in Treasury costs. These increased Treasury costs have dramatically changed the political climate surrounding the peanut program. In this light, the effects of GATT appear manageable; NAFTA may ultimately require major policy reform. Possible alternatives are presented.

Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:joaaec:15267

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.15267

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