Evaluating Changes to Prevented Planting Provision on Moral Hazard

Christopher N. Boyer and S. Aaron Smith

Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 2019, vol. 51, issue 2

Abstract: Prevented planting provision in crop insurance protects producers from failure to plant attributable to natural causes. We determined the impact of this provision at various crop insurance coverage levels on prevented planting claims and ex post moral hazard. The moral hazard incentive in the prevented planting provision is stronger for corn than soybeans. Reducing the prevented planting coverage factor for corn could likely reduce moral hazard, but the degree of the reduction will likely depend on the revenue protection coverage level. Conversely, we found moral hazard is unlikely to occur for soybean production regardless of the revenue protection coverage level.

Keywords: Farm Management; Risk and Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:joaaec:356526

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.356526

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