Signaling Credit Risk in Agriculture: Implications for Capital Structure Analysis

Jianmei Zhao, Peter J. Barry and Ani Katchova

Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 2008, vol. 40, issue 3, 16

Abstract: Signaling is an important element in the lender-borrower relationship that influences the cost and availability of debt capital to agricultural borrowers. This paper analyzes the effects of signaling on farm capital structure in conjunction with the pecking order and trade-off theories. The aggregate estimation indicates that signaling does affect agricultural credit relationships through measures of past cash flow and profitability. High-quality borrowers achieve greater credit capacity by providing lenders with valid signals of their financial status, while adjusting toward target debt levels over time and following the pecking order relationship in the short run.

Keywords: Agribusiness; Risk and Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Journal Article: Signaling Credit Risk in Agriculture: Implications for Capital Structure Analysis (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:joaaec:47260

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.47260

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