Szkic o patentach i łagodzeniu kar
Adam Karbowski
Gospodarka Narodowa-The Polish Journal of Economics, 2020, vol. 2020, issue 1
Abstract:
The purpose of this note is to investigate the relationship between patents and market collusion. Specifically, by using game theory tools, it is shown that patents can act as a leniency mechanism, i.e., they can enable firms to leave a cartel without the risk of retaliation. However, the socially beneficial role of patents is limited because the Bertrand competition itself breaks the collusion via the existence of a prisoner’s dilemma between sufficiently myopic market rivals. In the prisoner’s dilemma, two social tensions, fear and greed, make firms deviate from collusion. Patenting breaks the collusion, but at the social cost of a temporary patent monopoly in the product market.
Keywords: Consumer/Household; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/359203/files/Karbowski.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:polgne:359203
DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.359203
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Gospodarka Narodowa-The Polish Journal of Economics from Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie / SGH Warsaw School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().