COOPERATIVE ANTITRUST MONOPOLIZATION AND THE THEORY OF CONTESTABLE MARKETS

Terence Centner and Michael E. Wetzstein

Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1984, vol. 16, issue 01, 7

Abstract: The judiciary has relied on a firm's market share to evaluate the presence of monopoly power for a Sherman Act monopolization violation. However, an allegation that a firm's market share constitutes monopoly power may be refuted by evidence that there exists a contestable market. Contestable market theory shows that there is no monopoly power where there exists a threat of entry of other firms. This theory thereby offers agricultural cooperatives, which may have a large market share by reasons of the antitrust immunity provided by the Capper-Volstead Act, an argument to overcome allegations of a Sherman Act monopolization violation.

Keywords: Industrial; Organization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1984
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Journal Article: Cooperative Antitrust Monopolization and the Theory of Contestable Markets (1984)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:sojoae:29625

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.29625

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