THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MTN: CAN THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REACH AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE IN THE GATT?

Glenn C.W. Ames

Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1992, vol. 24, issue 2, 10

Abstract: A model of the political economy of agricultural policy formulation was used to analyze the current stalemate in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The combination of social welfare increasing and transferring policies in the European Community and the U.S. is one of the primary causes of the deadlock in trade negotiations. The Community's farm policy of high internal price supports, limited market access, and export subsidies represents short-term equilibria in the market for social-welfare policies which distribute benefits to producers at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. Thus, the opportunity for internal reform of the CAP leading to a compromise in the GATT negotiations is problematic at best. However, international commitments to agricultural policy reform will force the Community to make concessions which will bring equivalent change in domestic policy.

Keywords: International; Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:sojoae:29642

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.29642

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