ENTREPRENEURSHIP, SANCTIONS, AND LABOR CONTRACTING

Leo C. Polopolus and Robert D. Emerson

Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1991, vol. 23, issue 01, 12

Abstract: Entrepreneurs innovate their individual business organizations not only to deal with production and price risks, but also to cope with the risk of sanctions or penalties imposed by society's laws and regulations. More specifically, labor-intensive agricultural firms, faced with potentially large fines for violation of immigration and labor laws, increasingly modify the organization of their firms by shifting the management of routine seasonal labor jobs to independent farm labor contractors. The use of labor contracting is further intensified because of the effectiveness of labor contractors in the recruitment of illegal aliens.

Keywords: Agribusiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:sojoae:30283

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.30283

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