TRANSACTION COSTS, RISK AVERSION, AND CHOICE OF TENURE REVISITED

Donald Baron

Journal of Agricultural Economics Research, 1980, vol. 32, issue 02, 10

Abstract: The related questions of how tenants and landlords choose leasing contracts and how these contracts affect efficient allocation of resources continue to divide economists This article rejects answers suggested by transaction cost models developed by Cheung and by Ip and Stahl and argues that among risk-averse farmers, contract choice is determined by the relative intensities of tenant and landlord aversion to risk The risk model examined here suggested that all contract forms - whether fixed rent, fixed wage, or crop share - can generally achieve the same allocative efficiency

Keywords: Demand and Price Analysis; Research Methods/Statistical Methods; Risk and Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1980
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uersja:148631

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.148631

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