Unilateral Decisions to Hire Managers in Markets with Capitalist and Labor-Managed Firms

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics, 2018, vol. 5, issue 4, 190-196

Abstract: This paper examines the equilibrium outcomes of firms’ decision games to hire managers when there is a capitalist firm competing against a labor-managed firm. The paper shows that if only the capitalist firm hires a manager, then the equilibrium coincides with the solution when neither firm hires a manager. In addition, the paper shows that if only the labor-managed firm hires a manager, then at equilibrium the capitalist firm’s output and the market price are lower than when neither firm hires a manager.

Keywords: Capitalist firm; labor-managed firm; managerial delegation; mixed duopoly; Cournot model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:air:journl:v:5:y:2018:i:4:p:190

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17557451

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