Pre-play Research in a Model of Bank Runs

J. Daniel Aromi

Económica, 2013, vol. 59, 57-86

Abstract: We consider an extension of a bank run game assuming that depositors do not agree on the action to be taken but can perform research in order to learn about others’ initial intentions. Equilibrium indeterminacy, a characteristic of bank run games, re-emerges in the game with information acquisition. In the configuration under analysis, the equilibrium with positive levels of information acquisition results in higher probability of bankruptcy. Additionally, correlated signals enlarge the set of parameter values such that there exist equilibria with positive levels of information acquisition and higher probability of bankruptcy.

Keywords: Bank runs; Coordination. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Journal Article: Pre-play Research in a Model of Bank Runs (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:akh:journl:586

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