Detecting Collusion on Highway Procurement

Florencia M. Gabrielli
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Florencia M. Gabrielli: Universidad Nacional de Cuyo - CONICET

Económica, 2013, vol. 59, 127-165

Abstract: This paper proposes a procedure to detect collusion in asymmetric first-price procurement. The main objective is twofold. First, to provide a methodology to detect collusion using a structural approach, and second to apply the methodology to field data on procurement auctions for highway construction in California. I identify two different sets of firms as potential ring members. Relying on an exogenous number of bidders and the assumption that within each type bidders are symmetric, I find evidence supporting the collusive scheme, for the two mentioned sets of firms by comparing a model of competition and a model of collusion.

Keywords: Auctions; Cartel; Structural Approach; Collusion; Competition. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:akh:journl:588

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