Financial Contracting: A Survey of Empirical Research and Future Directions
Michael Roberts () and
Annual Review of Financial Economics, 2009, vol. 1, issue 1, 207-226
We review recent evidence and future directions for empirical research on financial contracting in the context of corporate finance. Specifically, we survey evidence pertaining to incentive conflicts, control rights, collateral, renegotiation, and interactions between financial contracts and other governance mechanisms. We also discuss directions for future research, concluding that the financial contracting approach offers a potentially fruitful perspective for empirical researchers seeking to better understand a variety of issues in corporate finance including capital structure, investment policy, payout policy, and corporate governance.
Keywords: security design; incentive conflicts; control rights; corporate finance; moral hazard; adverse selection; collateral; renegotiation; corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G24 G31 G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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