The Economics of Infection Control

Mark Gersovitz ()

Annual Review of Resource Economics, 2011, vol. 3, issue 1, 277-296

Abstract: Economics plus epidemiology provide models of infections and associated behavior of private individuals. They show how infections generate problems of dynamic externalities, scope for government to offset externalities, and problems of the second best when government cannot or does not. Features of these models affect conclusions about individual behavior and government policy: the transition states into and out of infection; the nature of matching among susceptibles and infecteds; the opportunities for prevention, including vaccination, and for therapies and their costs; and the targeting of these health interventions at people, depending on health status. There may be multiple endemic optimal steady states.

Keywords: health; infections; prevention; therapies; epidemiology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 I12 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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