The Economics of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement

Jay Shimshack

Annual Review of Resource Economics, 2014, vol. 6, issue 1, 339-360

Abstract: Without monitoring and enforcement, environmental laws are largely nonbinding guidance. Although economists and philosophers have thought seriously about the broader public enforcement of law since at least the eighteenth century, environmental monitoring and enforcement remain both understudied and controversial. This article reviews what we do and do not know about the subject. I review common environmental enforcement institutions, prescriptive and descriptive theories, empirical evidence on regulator behavior, and empirical evidence on deterrence effects.

Keywords: inspections; sanctions; penalties; deterrence; pollution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K32 K42 Q53 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (71)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-resource-091912-151821 (application/pdf)
Full text downloads are only available to subscribers. Visit the abstract page for more information.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:anr:reseco:v:6:y:2014:p:339-360

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.annualreviews.org/action/ecommerce

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Annual Review of Resource Economics from Annual Reviews Annual Reviews 4139 El Camino Way Palo Alto, CA 94306, USA.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by http://www.annualreviews.org ().