Tropical medicine: The economics and the evolving practice of antitrust remedies in Brazil

Eduardo Ribeiro

Russian Journal of Economics, 2020, vol. 6, issue 3, 294-314

Abstract: Antitrust remedies are a central part of the competition policy toolbox. Their actual use and design depends on interrelated factors such as the Antitrust Authority's analytical capabilities, institutional design and bargaining power. Economics can contribute to the design of remedies, using a transaction cost, principal-agent incomplete contract framework, as remedies are generally drawn as an agreement between the Authority and parties under extensive information asymmetries. This provides a rationale for the principles and policies' choices of the Brazilian Antitrust Authority, CADE, on remedies over the past decade. There has been a shift towards agreements instead of unilaterally imposed remedies, extensive use of trustees and communication by an Antitrust Remedies Guide to signal CADE's policies.

Keywords: antitrust; remedies; mergers; Brazil. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://rujec.org/article/51143/

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arh:jrujec:v:6:y:2020:i:3:p:294-314

DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.6.51143

Access Statistics for this article

Russian Journal of Economics is currently edited by Alexey Kudrin

More articles in Russian Journal of Economics from ARPHA Platform
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Teodor Georgiev ().