Investor and Venture Fund Managers Remuneration Paid Mechanism Based on Principle-Agent Model

Yih-Chearng Shiue, Ming-Chang Lee, Pei-Jian Lin and Yao-Wen Huang

Asian Journal of Empirical Research, 2015, vol. 5, issue 9, 143-151

Abstract: In order to solve problems in investor and venture fund managers remuneration paid mechanism, the paper presents the asymmetric information games existing in construction mechanism through information economics viewpoints. The paper building investor and venture fund managers remuneration paid mechanism based on principal- agent theory, remuneration excitement and risk constraints. The results of this paper are: (1) Under the venture fund managers’ optimal efforts, investors willing to pay for agent fund profits’ optimal proportion (2) venture fund manager willing to inject capital amount. The main contribution of this paper is to examine the problems of principal-agent relationship between the principal and agent. The paper validates the model (1) Optimal contract model between investor and venture fund managers (2) Equilibrium contract model between investor and venture fund managers. Finally, the paper gives some suggestions and conclusion on how to enhance the Investor and venture fund managers remuneration paid mechanism.

Keywords: Principle-agent model; game theory; asymmetric information; equilibrium contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://archive.aessweb.com/index.php/5004/article/view/3854/6065 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:asi:ajoerj:v:5:y:2015:i:9:p:143-151:id:3854

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Asian Journal of Empirical Research from Asian Economic and Social Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Robert Allen ().