Dead on Arrival: The Politics of Budget Making at the Federal Level

Attiat F. Ott

Athens Journal of Business & Economics, 2018, vol. 4, issue 1, 25-42

Abstract: Using Statistics of U.S. federal budget dating back to the 1900’s the paper provides a test to a proposition in the political science literature stating that a divided government, where the legislative branch and the executive branch belong to different political parties, give rise to worse political budget policy outcomes than would be the case under a unified government.

Keywords: Budget making of the United States federal government; Unified versus divided form of government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ate:journl:ajbev4i1-2

DOI: 10.30958/ajbe.4.1.2

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