The Effect of Moral Intelligence on Incentive Reversal within the Framework of Teamwork: A Behavioral Approach Based on Simultaneous and Sequential Games (in Persian)

Omolbanin Jalali (), Zahra Nasrollahi () and Madjid Hatefi Majumerd ()
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Omolbanin Jalali: Faculty of Economic, Management and Accounting, Yazd University, Yazd, Iran
Zahra Nasrollahi: Department of Economics, Faculty of Economic, Management and Accounting, Yazd University,Yazd, Iran
Madjid Hatefi Majumerd: Faculty of Economics, Tehran University, Tehran, Iran.

The Journal of Planning and Budgeting (٠صلنامه برنامه ریزی و بودجه), 2018, vol. 23, issue 3, 143-163

Abstract: Moral intelligence is one of the factors influencing the performance of individuals in team activities that can lead to a reduction in the level of incentive reversal among team members. In this regard, the present study aims to investigate the effects of moral intelligence on the performance of individuals and the occurrence of the incentive reversal among team members in an experimental environment using simultaneous and sequential games. To this end, 182 students from Yazd University were selected as a sample, each played 12 games (6 sequential games and 6 simultaneous games), and a total of 2184 observations were collected. The results of this study were categorized into two levels: individual and group; the results of the individual level showed that moral intelligence has no effect on the incentive reversal, but the results of the group level showed that moral intelligence has affected the incentive reversal. The results of the team level showed that the relationship between moral intelligence and the incentive reversal is negative; this means that by increasing moral intelligence, the degree of incentive reversal in team activity decreases.

Keywords: Moral Intelligence; Incentive Reversal; Game Theory; Team Production; Experimental Study; Behavioral Economics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:auv:jipbud:v:23:y:2018:i:3:p:143-163

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