EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Compliance Behaviour in Europe in the Early Stages of the Covid-19 Pandemic: What Can We Learn from Game Theory and Experimental Economics?

Žiga Velkavrh ()
Additional contact information
Žiga Velkavrh: Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Mathematics, Natural Sciences and Information Technologies and Andrej Marušič Institute, University of Primorska, Slovenia

Acta Economica Et Turistica, 2022, vol. 8, issue 2, 147-167

Abstract: Studies across Europe have shown that in the early phases of the COVID-19 pandemic people did not fully comply with preventive measures and recommendations given by the authorities. As evidenced, compliance rates may depend on many different factors, including personality traits, gender, age, and even irrational beliefs in conspiracy theories. These findings highlight heterogeneity among people and, in combination with insights from game theory and experimental economics, suggest that it would be difficult to sustain high compliance rates and prevent the spread of the deadly virus without imposing stricter measures that were adopted later.

Keywords: compliance behaviour; COVID-19; Europe; experimental economics; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/417263 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:awd:acectu:v:8:y:2022:i:2:p:147-167

DOI: 10.46672/aet.8.2.1

Access Statistics for this article

Acta Economica Et Turistica is currently edited by Ante Samodol

More articles in Acta Economica Et Turistica from Libertas International University
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mario Pallua ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:awd:acectu:v:8:y:2022:i:2:p:147-167