Systemic risk in central counterparty clearing houses

Anonymous,

Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions, 2014, vol. 7, issue 3, 226-230

Abstract: The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act's requirement to centrally clear over-the-counter derivatives through the creation of central clearing counterparties (CCPs) is concentrating credit and market risk to an extent where CCPs are too big to fail. This paper examines the systemic risk consequence of this concentration and makes certain recommendations for its mitigation.

Keywords: central clearing counterparty; concentration risk; systemic risk; margin; stress testing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E5 G2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aza:rmfi00:y:2014:v:7:i:3:p:226-230

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