Italian real estate funds and regulatory structure: effects on Nav discount
Massimo Biasin,
Anna Grazia Quaranta () and
Emanuela Giacomini
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Massimo Biasin: Università di Macerata
Emanuela Giacomini: Università di Macerata
BANCARIA, 2010, vol. 01, 31-45
Abstract:
This paper investigates the effects of the Italian real estate funds governance and intermediation structure on market prices discount over Nav figures.The hypothesis is that the mandatory provision of a shareholders’ meeting of newly established Reits offers potential protection to investors from managers’ opportunistic behaviours when market discipline comes into play by inducing takeovers of poorly managed Reits. Nav discount may be influenced by other legal and economic Reits’ features like leverage, mandatory listing and finite life of the closed-end investment vehicle. The results show that Nav discount increases as long as time to maturity and size of the fund increase. Conversely, Nav discount is negatively affected by liquidity (turnover) and leverage.The provision of a shareholders’ meeting appears to have improved the investors’ governance capability and reducing Nav discount.
Keywords: Reits, Nav, market prices, discount; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G20 G23 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ban:bancar:v:01:y:2010:m:january:p:31-45
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