Asymmetric information, market failures and bad banks: international experiences and proposals for Italy

Claudio Scardovi
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Claudio Scardovi: Università Bocconi, Milano

BANCARIA, 2009, vol. 11, 70-83

Abstract: Many kinds of bad banks have already been launched in several countries following the financial crisis, producing successful results, reducing asymmetric information and market failures related to adverse selection and moral hazard. On the basis of the characteristics of these experiences, it is possible to delineate some strategic options to be implemented in Italy.

Keywords: crisi finanziaria; asimmetrie informative; bad bank (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ban:bancar:v:11:y:2009:m:november:p:70-83

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