Italian Hedge funds’ performance and contractual arrangements

Alberto Burchi and Maria Debora Braga
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Alberto Burchi: Università di Perugia
Maria Debora Braga: Università della Valle d’Aosta

BANCARIA, 2012, vol. 11, 54-63

Abstract: Through a research based on a sample of 52 Italian hedge funds in the 2006-2010 period, the role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performances is analyzed. The study’s results contradict those achieved by Agarwal, Daniel and Naik in 2009, by demonstrating that in Italy the presence of particular contractual arrangements is not a criterion to discriminate between skilled and non-skilled fund managers

JEL-codes: G11 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ban:bancar:v:11:y:2012:m:november:p:54-63

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