Game-Theoretic Models of Labour Conflicts

Dancho Danchev

Economic Studies journal, 2003, issue 2, 89-119

Abstract: This work makes an attempt at theoretical summary of the major issues related to the essence, types, forms and procedures applied for resolving of collective bargain disputes and the major goals and principles of the negotiations intended for dispute resolving. The work gives reason to the methodological basis of the potential for mathematical formalization of labor conflicts from the viewpoint of the theory for regulating the dialectical contradictions. Concrete patterns are suggested to serve as prove for the usability of the game theory to analyze collective labor disputes in antagonistic and cooperative aspect.

JEL-codes: C71 C72 J51 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bas:econst:y:2003:i:2:p:89-119

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