Tax Corruption: Stimuli and Restraints

Konstantin Pashev

Economic Thought journal, 2005, issue 3, 60-87

Abstract: This paper studies recent findings of business and tax administration surveys on the scope and causes of corruption in tax administration in Bulgaria in the context of the theoretical models and empirical tests of corruption and evasion. It is an attempt to shift the current policy focus on sanctions and brakes to positive incentives. It studies the specific demand and supply-side drivers of corruption for the two broad categories of corruption services supplied by the tax administration: those, related to tax evasion and those, related to preferential treatment of taxpayers. On these grounds it draws some policy implications on the opportunities and limitations of the use of incentives, especially wage and bonus incentives in the fight against corruption in tax administration.

JEL-codes: H26 H83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bas:econth:y:2005:i:3:p:60-87

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