Tax Corruption Drivers and Deterrents: Lessons from Bulgaria

Konstantin Pashev

Economic Thought journal, 2005, issue 7, 130-155

Abstract: This paper studies recent findings of business and tax administration surveys on the scope and causes of corruption in tax administration in Bulgaria in the context of the theoretical models and empirical tests of corruption and evasion. It is an attempt to shift the current policy focus on sanctions and deterrents in the direction of positive incentives. It studies the specific demand-side and supply-side drivers of corruption for the two broad categories of corruption services supplied by the tax administration: those related to tax evasion and those related to preferential treatment of taxpayers. It is on this basis that policy implications are drawn with a focus on the opportunities and limitations of the use of incentives including pay bonuses in the fight against corruption.

JEL-codes: H26 H83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bas:econth:y:2005:i:7:p:130-155

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