Segmentation in the public sector – a reality or a chimera

Petar Mitev

Economic Thought journal, 2012, issue 5, 123-143

Abstract: The article studies the theoretical restrictions of public sector segmentation, derived from the concept of the purely public good, as well as from the views on revealing the public preferences thereto. It also highlights the weaknesses of the allocation efficiency and the available dialectical connection between it and the Oeyts theorem. It analyses statements of authors, pointing out the necessity to investigate the needs and to improve the public goods accordingly.

JEL-codes: D61 D71 H21 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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