Bayesian-Nash equilibria for fuzzy value auctions

Alexey Shvedov

Economic Analysis Letters, 2024, vol. 3, issue 2, 83-93

Abstract: This paper analyses a model of private value auctions with symmetric risk-neutral bidders, where bidders' private values of an indivisible good are fuzzy. The auction is studied as a game with incomplete information. Fuzzy random variables, their quantile functions, and expressions for expectations through quantile functions are used. An explicit expression for the solution is found. Also, expected bidders' payments are studied.

Keywords: Auction theory; Equilibrium strategy; Bidder's payment; Fuzzy random variable; Quantile function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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