Pension Funds: The Importance of Corporate Governance
Clea Beatriz Macagnan,
Cristiane Benetti,
Luiz Alberto Mangoni and
Daniel Francisco Vancin
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Clea Beatriz Macagnan: Federal University of Paraiba - Cidade Universitária - João Pessoa – PB, 58051-900, Brazil
Cristiane Benetti: ICN Business School and CEREFIGE - 86 Rue Sergent Blandan, 54000 Nancy - France
Luiz Alberto Mangoni: Fisul College - Av. Pres. Vargas, 561 - Centro, Garibaldi - RS, 95720-000, Brazil
Daniel Francisco Vancin: Vale do Rio dos Sinos University - Av. Unisinos, 950 - Cristo Rei, São Leopoldo - RS, 93022-750, Brazil
Journal of Information Economics, 2024, vol. 2, issue 2, 24-45
Abstract:
This study analyzed whether the level of corporate governance of companies listed on the Brazilian capital market is related to the investment decisions of Brazilian pension funds. We start from the assumption that the corporate governance system mitigates the moral risk, that may arise in the relationship between corporate managers and investors and respective shareholders, Brazilian pension funds. Shareholding dispersion would enable opportunism for corporate managers, making decisions focused on their interests to the detriment of shareholders or investors. The governance system would signal that this behavior would be controlled, signaling safer behavior for investors. Thus, the hypothesis is that the level of corporate governance would attract pension funds that would understand this system as reducing investment risk. To test this, we used panel data, with a sample of 1,582 observations of companies listed on the Brazilian Stock Exchange (B3) from 2010 to 2017. The statistical results show that corporate governance positively correlates with investment in pension funds. This leads to the conclusion that, for Brazilian pension funds, companies' signaling about their corporate governance practices is a risk-mitigating factor. Furthermore, these results allow us to infer that the company's governance level associated with leverage is a differentiating signaling element as the evidence points to a positive relationship.
Keywords: pension funds; corporate governance; emerging markets; debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bba:j00008:v:2:y:2024:i:2:p:24-45:d:355
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