Measuring the extent of synergies among innovation actors and their contributions: the Helix as a cooperative game

Pierre Dehez () and Eustache Mêgnigbêto
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Eustache Mêgnigbêto: Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Antwerp, Belgium

Journal of Information Economics, 2024, vol. 2, issue 2, 46-56

Abstract: We generalize the 3-player game introduced by Mêgnigbêto (2018) to analyze the synergies existing between universities, the industry and the government in the Triple Helix, a model of research and innovation introduced by Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz (1995). We consider situations involving any number of actors and we allow for a differentiation of their contributions. The resulting game has nonnegative Harsanyi dividends, implying its convexity. The relative size of the core measures the extent of the synergies and the Shapley value measures the contribution of each actor to these synergies. Incidentally, the resulting game lends itself to a wide range of applications.

Keywords: innovation; transferable utility games; core; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Measuring the extent of synergies among innovation actors and their contributions: the Helix as a cooperative game (2024)
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