The Interplay of Military Structures and Coups in French-Speaking West African Countries: A Focus on the Presidential Guard

Ezekiel Allen and Elsie Asamoah
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Ezekiel Allen: Pan African University, Yaounde, Cameroon
Elsie Asamoah: Pan African University, Yaounde, Cameroon

International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, 2024, vol. 8, issue 1, 2027-2037

Abstract: This paper examines the interplay between military structures and the prevalence of coups in French-speaking West African countries, with a focus on the destabilizing role of presidential guards. It outlines factors that motivate military interventions against civilian rulers, including perceived corruption, public discontent, military divisions, personal ambitions of top brass, and ideological visions. Comparative analysis explores common drivers and patterns across recent coup attempts in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger. In many cases, elite, highly-trained presidential guard units and special forces played a pivotal role in decisively ousting leaders by arresting them or providing vital backing to plotters. Their outsized influence within politicized hierarchies enabled them to shape political transitions consistent with institutional interests. Case studies on the 2022 Burkina Faso coup and 2010 Niger coup highlight how presidential guards can both enable and end democratic rule. The paper assesses consequences of seizures of power, typically suspending civil liberties and empowering military factions over institutional control despite initial stability promises. It also examines the inconsistent leverage of regional bodies like ECOWAS and former colonial powers against coup attempts based on security priorities rather than democratic principles. Finally, it outlines reform efforts to deter interventions through security sector changes, governance improvements, early warning systems and constitutional safeguards. However, deeply embedded incentives and capacity for coups persists. The analysis cautions the need for depoliticizing militaries and avoiding the nurturing of specific elite units for regime protection given the risk this poses.

Date: 2024
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