Economics at your fingertips  

Tunneling: Evidence from Family Business Groups of Pakistan

Shahid Hussain () and Nabeel Safdar
Additional contact information
Shahid Hussain: National University of Sciences and Technology, Islamabad
Nabeel Safdar: National University of Sciences and Technology, Islamabad

Business & Economic Review, 2018, vol. 10, issue 2, 97-122

Abstract: This paper investigates a critical aspect of agency conflict between dispersed minority and majority (controlling) shareholders in firms affiliated with family business groups. Corporate governance literature indicates that majority shareholders can exploit minority shareholders through tunneling the resources for their benefit or they provide insurance through propping to group firms in distress. For years 2009-2013, the study uses a unique hand-picked data set of 290 non-financial (i.e. 177 family business group and 113 stand-alone or non-group) firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX). The study finds that majority shareholders expropriate minority shareholders by tunneling (transferring) important resources from low cash-flow rights firms affiliated with family business group. While measuring the sensitivities of firms to the industry earnings shocks, the empirical results reveal that about 15% resources of low cash-flow rights firms are tunneled to high cash-flow rights firms in family business groups. It is also confirmed that equity held by directors representing majority shareholders has negative relationship with earnings of minority shareholders in low cash-flow rights firms affiliated with family business groups. These findings have certain policy implications for governance related regulation development, diverse shareholders and firm management.

Keywords: Tunneling; business groups; corporate governance; ownership concentration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G28 G32 G38 M48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Business & Economic Review from Institute of Management Sciences, Peshawar, Pakistan Institute of Management Sciences 1-A, Sector E-5, Phase VII, Hayatabad, Peshawar- Pakistan. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dr. Attaullah Shah ().

Page updated 2018-09-29
Handle: RePEc:bec:imsber:v:10:y:2018:i:2:p:97-122