Board Characteristics, Political Connections, and Corporate Cash Holdings: The Role of Firm Size and Political Regime

Sabeeh Ullah and Yasir Kamal
Additional contact information
Yasir Kamal: Institute of Management Sciences, Peshawar

Business & Economic Review, 2017, vol. 9, issue 1, 157-179

Abstract: This paper examines the relationship of board characteristics with cash holding, and the interplay of political connections on this relationship. For this purpose, panel data of 150 non-financial firms ranging from 2001 to 2014 are used. We document that board characteristics are important predictors of a firm’s cash holding in Pakistan. Theoretically, the findings mainly support agency theory. Consistent with prior studies, our empirical results show some statistical variations in large and small size sampled firms, and dictator and democratic regimes. Moreover, we investigate the interplay of political connections on the relationship of board characteristics and cash holding. Our findings support the complementary effect hypothesis

Keywords: Board characteristics; cash holding; political connections; political regime (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://imsciences.edu.pk/files/journals/Vol%209%20Issue%201/Paper%209.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bec:imsber:v:9:y:2017:i:1:p:157-179

DOI: 10.22547/BER/9.1.9

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Business & Economic Review from Institute of Management Sciences, Peshawar, Pakistan Institute of Management Sciences 1-A, Sector E-5, Phase VII, Hayatabad, Peshawar- Pakistan. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dr. Attaullah Shah ().