Economics at your fingertips  

Impact of Excess Control, Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance on Firm Performance of Diversified Group Firms in Pakistan

Waseem Ullah (), Shahid Ali and Sajid Mehmood
Additional contact information
Waseem Ullah: Capital University of Science and Technology, Islamabad
Shahid Ali: Institute of Management Sciences, Peshawar
Sajid Mehmood: University of Gujrat, Gujrat

Business & Economic Review, 2017, vol. 9, issue 2, 49-72

Abstract: This paper attempts to explore the effect of excess control, ownership structure and corporate governance on firm performance in Pakistan. The study takes a sample of 184 non-financial sectors’ group firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) covering a period from 2004 to 2012. The multiple regression models are applied using panel data framework to test the significance of relationship. The results are consistent with the findings of the prior studies conducted in both advanced and emerging economies. The results show that firm ownership is a strong influential factor in affecting firm performance in Pakistan. Both inside ownership and ownership concentration are negatively related to firm performance consistent with divergence of interest effect and entrenchment effect. However, inside ownership squared is strongly positively related to firm performance indicating that inside ownership beyond a certain threshold level started to influence firm performance positively consistent with incentives effect. Ownership disparity affects strongly negatively the financial performance of group firms consistent with the divergence of interest effect. Institutional ownership contributes positively towards firm performance. Noticeably, board independence and outside block holdings play a significantly positive role in affecting financial performance of the group firms in Pakistan. The results show strong evidence that ultimate controllers in group firms use complex ownership and pyramidal structures to extend their ultimate control over many firms with least cash flow rights. The higher the divergence between ownership and control, the greater the potential of the ultimate controllers exerted their entrenched behavior in group firms. These results highlight the internal corporate governance problems faced by the group firms and suggest the need for strengthening the corporate governance mechanism in Pakistan.

Keywords: Business groups; corporate governance; ownership structure; excess contro; ownership-control disparity; firm performance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:


Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Business & Economic Review from Institute of Management Sciences, Peshawar, Pakistan Institute of Management Sciences 1-A, Sector E-5, Phase VII, Hayatabad, Peshawar- Pakistan. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dr. Attaullah Shah ().

Page updated 2019-03-30
Handle: RePEc:bec:imsber:v:9:y:2017:i:2:p:49-72