Understanding the Linkage among Public Procurement (PP), Corruption, and Tax Morale (TM) Through Agency Theory (AT): A Review
Zeeshan Siddiqui ()
Business & Economic Review, 2017, vol. 9, issue 3, 258-288
This paper aims to develop an inter-disciplinary conceptual framework through review of literature on the relationship among corruption, corruption in public procurement (CiPP), and effects of CiPP on the tax morale (TM). As proposed by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), the ‘Agency theory’ (AT) is applied to view and explain the occurrence of multiple agency problem(s) in public procurement (PP) arising due to high stakes of divergent stakeholders such as: (1) electorate (the public), (2) political elite (elected representative(s), chief executive(s), and cabinet minister(s) etc.), (3) influence group(s), and (4) PP professionals (PPP). Potential of PP to act as a potent tool of public-policy-implementation is suggested by scholars if transparency in PP is ensured. Effect of inefficiencies in governance on the taxpayers’ TM is highlighted in the literature however, CiPP is presented as an inefficiency in judicious utilization of public money. Corruption-free PP will not only help the governments to ‘do more with less’ by eliminating inefficiencies (CiPP) but establish the moral authority of governments (especially in developing countries) to raise TM of taxpayers for raising tax collection and channelizing taxpayers’ money for improving socioeconomic indicators in the developing economies. Two main types of corruption (grand, and legislative) are in the scholastic focus from different subjects however, petty corruption (here CiPP) is not much focused in the studies conducted so far.
Keywords: Public policy; Public procurement (PP); corruption; corruption in public procurement (CiPP); tax morale (TM) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bec:imsber:v:9:y:2017:i:3:p:258-288
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