Cooperation, competition, or conflict? A review of the multiple international sides of money
Chiara Alvisi ()
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Chiara Alvisi: Department of Law and Economics, Sapienza University of Rome
Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, 2025, vol. 9, issue 2, 23-28
Abstract:
Is money more likely to be a means of cooperation, competition, or conflict? The following thoughts discuss the main strands of literature investigating the dynamic role of money in a fast-changing financial world, thus trying to trace out the main social, economic and geopolitical implications of the evolution of the international monetary system toward the adoption of competing currencies. This study combines behavioral, monetary economic, and geoeconomics perspectives to introduce a methodological innovation to the traditional analysis of the role of money, providing a holistic view of ongoing monetary phenomena suited to interpret the increasing complexity of financial landscape and the new challenges of monetary policy in an environment of geopolitical tensions.
Keywords: currency competition; digital currency; financial literacy; international monetary system; monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:beh:jbepv1:v:9:y:2025:i:2:p:23-28
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