Hold-up in Ventures for Technology Transfer

Klaus Spremann
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Klaus Spremann: University of St. Gallen, School of Finance, Swiss Institute of Banking and Finance, Rosenbergstr 52, 9000 St. Gallen, Switzerland

Technology Transfer and Entrepreneurship, 2017, vol. 4, issue 1, 47-53

Abstract: Entrepreneurs and Investors found ventures for transferring technology and bringing it closer to the market. Focussing on a situation in which the investor exercises hold-up at the disadvantage of the entrepreneur, this paper works on three points: We identify (1) conditions which make hold-up possible, and discuss (2) measures which help entrepreneurs to protect themselves against hold-up. (3) The balance of powers in a venture is related to returns to scale. Overall, the paper contributes to the theory of small-seized firms which are exposed to high uncertainties including behavioural opportunism.

Keywords: Agency theory; hold-up; incomplete contracts; innovation; entrepreneur; knowledge; investor; technology risk; twosided markets; venture risk. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ben:ttebsp:v:4:y:2017:i:1:p:47-53

DOI: 10.2174/2213809904666161221102119

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