ANALIZA MODELA OSIGURANJA PRIMENOM BESKOALICIONE IGRE (ANALYSIS MODEL OF INSURANCE APPLICATION NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES)

Zoran Popović

Ekonomske ideje i praksa, 2016, issue 23, 7 - 17

Abstract: U ovom radu analiziran je model osiguranja primenom metodologije beskoalicione igre. Cilj istraživanja je ispitivanje postojanja Nešove ravnoteže u definisanom modelu. Analizirane su situacije potpune i nepotpune informisanosti igrača, a zatim definisana strateška i informaciona refleksija istog hijerarhijskog nivoa. Analiza je pokazala da u slučaju potpune informisanosti osiguranika postoji ravnotežno stanje modela i da je to igra sa nultom sumom. Nepotpuna informisanost osiguranika, kao realno stanje na tržištu osiguranja, dovodi do toga da ne postoji ravnotežno rešenje definisanog modela osiguranja. Da bi se obezbedila egzistencija ravnotežnog rešenja potrebno je uspostaviti viši hijerarhijski nivo informisanosti.

Keywords: model osiguranja; beskoaliciona igra; informaciona refleksija (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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