Auctioning and Bargaining: An Econometric Study of Timber Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices

Elyakime, Bernard, et al

Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 1997, vol. 15, issue 2, 209-20

Abstract: This paper considers a first-place sealed-bid auction where the seller's reservation price is not announced in advance. The authors allow for a second-round of bargaining and consider the Nash bargaining outcome when the object is unsold after the auctioning round. They characterize the bidder's and seller's Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategies. The distributions of the buyers' and sellers' private values are estimated by nonlinear least squares from auction data on standing timber while solving numerically the differential equations characterizing the equilibrium strategies. The performance of the estimated model is compared to a model in which the players behave myopically. Coauthors are Jean-Jacques Laffont, Patrice Loisel, and Quang Vuong.

Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bes:jnlbes:v:15:y:1997:i:2:p:209-20

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